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Confronting the Biased Algorithm: 
The Danger of Admitting Facial 
Recognition Technology Results  
in the Courtroom 
ABSTRACT 
From unlocking an iPhone to Facebook “tags,” facial recognition 
technology has become increasingly commonplace in modern society. In 
the wake of the Black Lives Matter movement and call for police reform 
in the United States, it is important now more than ever to consider the 
implications of law enforcement’s use of facial recognition technology. A 
study from the National Institute of Standards and Technology found 
that facial recognition algorithms generated higher rates of false 
positives for Black faces—sometimes up to one hundred times more false 
identifications—than white faces. Given the embedded bias of this 
technology and its increased prevalence, the lack of federal regulation of 
facial recognition technology and its uses by law enforcement are 
alarming. This Note explores issues that arise with law enforcement’s 
use of facial recognition technology and how results from the technology 
should be treated in the criminal justice system.  
This Note cautions against admitting results from facial 
recognition technology into evidence in criminal trials based on the 
current state of the industry and the technology. Further, if facial 
recognition evidence is admitted, this Note argues that defendants 
should have access to the software’s source code to meaningfully 
challenge the evidence presented against them under the confrontation 
clause of the US Constitution. While this Note recognizes developers’ 
interest in protecting trade secrets, it nevertheless recommends that 
judges balance these interests with those of defendants and make  
case-by-case decisions about how to protect developers’ information 
without blocking defendants’ access to the software. 
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Robert Julian-Borchak Williams, a Black man from Michigan, 
was wrongfully arrested in January 2020 based on a flawed match from 
facial recognition technology.1 Williams was minding his own business 
at work when he received a call from law enforcement asking him to 
come to the police station to be arrested. At first, he thought the call 
was a prank.2 However, shortly after receiving this call, Williams was 
arrested on his lawn in front of his wife and two daughters.3 The police 
would not explain why Williams was being arrested; they merely 
showed him a piece of paper reading “felony warrant” and “larceny” 
alongside his driver’s license photo.4 When his wife asked where he was 
being taken, an officer simply responded, “Google it.”5 
 
 1. Kashmir Hill, Wrongfully Accused by an Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.ny-
times.com/2020/06/24/technology/facial-recognition-arrest.html [https://perma.cc/7GBH-ZH6Q] 
(last updated Aug. 3, 2020). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
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According to technology and legal experts, this may be the first 
known account of an American being wrongfully arrested based  
on a facial recognition algorithm.6 Williams was arrested after a 
surveillance camera image of a man robbing a retail store was uploaded 
to a facial recognition system and generated multiple matches with 
Williams’s driver’s license photo among the results.7 The results were 
shown to an eyewitness who had witnessed the crime five months prior 
and she selected Williams as the “correct” match.8 Since Williams’s 
arrest, US authorities have identified two other men wrongfully 
arrested based on facial recognition technology results; in each of these 
cases, the men mistakenly identified were Black.9 These recent 
examples of police implementation of facial recognition technology raise 
questions about the technology’s development and use. 
The facial recognition technology that police departments 
employ to identify suspects predominantly originates from private 
companies. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
conducted a study in 2019 that evaluated 189 different algorithms from 
99 developers, which represents the majority of the industry.10 The 
study found that the algorithms generated higher rates of false 
positives for Black faces—sometimes up to one hundred times more 
false identifications—than white faces.11 This study, and various 
others, reveal the widespread bias embedded in facial recognition 
technologies.12 
In the context of the Black Lives Matter movement and call for 
police reform in the United States, it is important to consider the 
consequences of using biased facial recognition technology in law 
enforcement. The inaccuracy of facial recognition technology raises 
concerns about the potential disparate impact of this technology in law 
enforcement and the justice system. With the increasing use of this 
technology, it is likely that prosecutors will soon seek to introduce it 
 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. Kashmir Hill, Another Arrest, and Jail Time, Due to a Bad Facial Recognition  
Match, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/29/technology/facial-recognition-misiden-
tify-jail.html [https://perma.cc/HHW3-XJTD] (last updated Jan. 6, 2021). 
 10. NIST Study Evaluates Effects of Race, Age, Sex on Face Recognition Software, NAT’L 
INST. STANDARDS & TECH. [hereinafter NIST Study], https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/ 
2019/12/nist-study-evaluates-effects-race-age-sex-face-recognition-software [https://perma.cc/ 
A94Z-DGSY] (last updated May 18, 2020). 
 11. Hill, supra note 1. 
 12. See id.; see also Joy Buolamwini, Opinion, When the Robot Doesn’t See Dark Skin, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/opinion/facial-analysis-technology-
bias.html [https://perma.cc/6NA2-2YQU]. 
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into evidence at criminal trials to establish probable cause or as 
evidence of an identification.13 Because this technology’s embedded bias 
currently places minorities at a disadvantage in the criminal justice 
system, courts should carefully examine the state of the technology, its 
regulation, and consider what rights criminal defendants should have 
if condemning facial recognition technology evidence is introduced.  
This Note addresses whether results from facial recognition 
technology should be admitted into evidence at trial and, if the results 
are admitted, what rights defendants should have to challenge this 
evidence. Part I gives background information on facial recognition 
technology, its use by law enforcement, and the lack of regulation. Part 
II examines whether results from facial recognition technology are 
admissible as reliable scientific evidence under the Daubert factors and 
analyzes the scope of defendants’ right to challenge the evidence if 
admitted. Part III suggests that results from facial recognition 
technology should not be admitted into evidence at trial based on the 
Daubert factors and further recommends legislation that would grant 
defendants access to the software used in their trials, with possible 
protections for the software developer’s trade secrets. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Black Lives Matter Movement 
The Black Lives Matter movement gained substantial traction 
in the United States on May 25, 2020, when George Floyd, a  
46-year-old Black man from Minneapolis, was killed by a Minneapolis 
police officer.14 Police officers responded to a call that claimed Floyd 
paid for a pack of cigarettes with a counterfeit $20 bill.15 Floyd allegedly 
resisted the officers when they handcuffed him, resulting in a white 
police officer pinning Floyd to the ground with his knee on Floyd’s 
neck.16 Despite Floyd’s repeated cries, “I can’t breathe,” the officer did 
not release his knee from Floyd’s neck for eight minutes and forty-six 
seconds, resulting in Floyd’s death. Bystanders captured this encounter 
on camera. Shortly after Floyd’s death, videos of the officer’s knee on 
 
 13. Kristine Hamann & Rachel Smith, Facial Recognition Technology: Where Will It Take 
Us?, 34 AM. BAR ASS’N CRIM. JUST. MAG. (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
criminal_justice/publications/criminal-justice-magazine/2019/spring/facial-recognition-technol-
ogy/ [https://perma.cc/7K9B-JQGA]. 
 14. See What to Know About the Death of George Floyd in Minneapolis, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd.html [https://perma.cc/YS6E-4HRJ]. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
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Floyd’s neck sparked outrage across the United States; citizens across 
the country took to the streets to protest police brutality and systemic 
racism in the weeks and months that followed.17  
However, Floyd’s death is not an isolated incident. Many in the 
Black Lives Matter movement drew comparisons to the death of Eric 
Garner. Garner was a Black man who died in police custody in New 
York City in 2014 after an officer held him in a chokehold.18 Garner 
repeatedly pleaded, “I can’t breathe.” Like Floyd, Garner’s death was 
also video recorded by a bystander. This plea, “I can’t breathe,” has 
become a rallying cry for the Black Lives Matter movement.19 Floyd and 
Garner are only two of the large number of Black victims of police 
brutality that have become the faces of the Black Lives Matter 
movement.  
The killings of George Floyd and Eric Garner demonstrate the 
dangerous correlation between systemic racism and police brutality. As 
the Black Lives Matter movement continues to publicly confront this 
correlation, it is imperative to also confront the disparate impact of the 
use of facial recognition technology in policing. As this technology 
pervades our society, its embedded bias20 is problematic for minorities 
who have historically been disproportionately targeted by law 
enforcement.21 The potential for facial recognition technology to further 
disadvantage minorities in the criminal justice system warrants a 
deeper examination of police methodology for using the technology and 
increased judicial scrutiny of its use as evidence in a criminal 
proceeding. 
B. Facial Recognition Technology Generally 
The use of facial recognition technology is increasingly common 
in modern society. Facial recognition is the process of comparing two 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Deborah Bloom & Jareen Imam, New York Man Dies After Chokehold by Police, 
CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2014/07/20/justice/ny-chokehold-death/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 
KAD7-TGP7] (last updated Dec. 8, 2014, 5:31 PM). 
 19. See id.; Benazir Wehelie & Amy Woodyatt, ‘I Can’t Breathe’: Hundreds Lie Down in 
Protest, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/03/world/gallery/george-floyd-lie-down-intl-scli/in-
dex.html [https://perma.cc/R4VJ-47AR] (last updated June 4, 2020, 7:19 AM).  
 20. See Hill, supra note 1 (describing a study that found that the algorithms generated 
higher rates of false positives for Black faces—sometimes up to one hundred times more false 
identifications—than Caucasian faces). 
 21. See Drew Desilver, Michael Lipka & Dalia Fahmy, 10 Things We Know About Race 
and Policing in the U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR.: FACT TANK (June 3, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/ 
fact-tank/2020/06/03/10-things-we-know-about-race-and-policing-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/ 
YK2Q-7NRM]. 
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images of faces to determine whether they represent the same person.22 
Facial recognition technology operates by first recognizing a face and 
then measuring its features.23 The algorithm identifies different 
landmarks on a person’s face that can be quantified, such as distance 
between the eyes, width of the nose, and depth of the eye sockets.24  
After taking these measurements, the software uses these landmarks 
to create a template to compare to preexisting images of known faces.25 
The algorithm analyzes pairs of faces and generates a score reflecting 
the similarity of the faces’ features.26 Facial recognition is probabilistic; 
the technology produces more or less likely matches, not definitive 
matches.27 These technologies “learn” over time as they are trained 
through exposure to large amounts of data and begin to infer rules from 
the patterns that emerge.28 
C. Law Enforcement Use of Facial Recognition Technology 
Facial recognition technology has proliferated many industries, 
and law enforcement is no exception. Law enforcement facial 
recognition networks include over 117 million American adults.29 
Because facial recognition databases include so many Americans, it is 
alarming that the use of this technology is essentially unregulated. 
There are currently no federal statutes that govern the use of facial 
recognition technology.30 Some state and local governments have 
stepped in to regulate where Congress has not, but most of their 
regulations have addressed general biometric information without 
specifics on facial recognition technology.31  
The Georgetown Law Center on Privacy and Technology 
conducted a year-long investigation of police departments across the 
 
 22. See Clare Garvie, Alvaro Bedoya & Jonathan Frankle, The Perpetual Line-Up:  
Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America, GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIV. & TECH. (Oct. 18, 2016), 
https://www.perpetuallineup.org/ [https://perma.cc/66QN-LUJ4]. 
 23. See Kevin Bonsor & Ryan Johnson, How Facial Recognition Systems Work, HOW 
STUFF WORKS, https://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/high-tech-gadgets/facial-recogni-
tion.htm [https://perma.cc/8EQL-U4G8] (last visited Feb. 22, 2021). 
 24. See id. 
 25. See Hamann & Smith, supra note 13. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See Garvie et al., supra note 22. 
 28. See Patrick W. Nutter, Comment, Machine Learning Evidence: Admissibility and 
Weight, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 919, 927–28 (2019). 
 29. Garvie et al., supra note 22. 
 30. Elizabeth McClellan, Facial Recognition Technology: Balancing the Benefits and  
Concerns, 15 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 363, 365 (2020). 
 31. Id. 
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country and published a report with the following striking statistics on 
the departments’ use of facial recognition technology: 
• At least one of four state or local police departments has the 
option to run facial recognition searches through their system or 
another agency’s system.32  
• At least twenty-six states allow law enforcement to run or request 
searches on their databases of driver’s license and identification 
photos, and these databases primarily contain information 
about law-abiding Americans.33  
States allow police departments to search databases that 
contain information about law-abiding Americans, exposing a 
significant transition in law enforcement investigations.34 Police have 
traditionally used fingerprint and DNA databases that are composed of 
information from criminal arrests and investigations.35 Now they  
are using driver’s license databases, tapping into a resource with 
information primarily from law-abiding Americans.36 Facial recognition 
searches have become routine at the federal and state level.37 The 
Georgetown report offers numbers on a few particular facial recognition 
systems: Ohio’s system was used 6,618 times by 504 agencies in its  
first eight months of operation while the San Diego Association of 
Government’s system is used by San Diego agencies for an average of 
about 560 searches each month. Pinellas County’s system in Florida is 
used to conduct around 8,000 searches per month.38 Further, the 
Georgetown report outlines four common ways that police use facial 
recognition technology: (1) stop and identify, (2) arrest and identify,  
(3) investigate and identify, and (4) real-time video surveillance.39  
Despite serious concerns, facial recognition technology has been 
useful for law enforcement in criminal case investigations.40 Police have 
used facial recognition evidence, along with other evidence, to establish 
probable cause for arrest for passport fraud and in identity theft cases.41 
The New York Police Department used facial recognition software on a 
surveillance image of a shooter in a nightclub to arrest him in 2017.42 
 
 32. Garvie et al., supra note 22. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See Hamann & Smith, supra note 13. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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Police were able to narrow down the two hundred likely matches that 
the software generated by comparing the images and looking for similar 
physical characteristics between them; the department then presented 
a photo array to witnesses to identify the shooter.43 
While law enforcement agencies are increasingly integrating 
facial recognition technology into their daily operations, they are not 
implementing sufficient safeguards to ensure the accuracy of their 
systems.44 Most law enforcement agencies contract with private 
companies that provide facial recognition software. One major facial 
recognition company, FaceFirst, publicly advertised a 95 percent 
accuracy rate for its facial recognition technology but then expressly 
disclaimed liability for failing to meet that threshold in contracts with 
the San Diego Association of Governments.45 This raises questions 
about the accuracy of the technologies created by these private 
companies. Most police departments rely on their officers to verify that 
the technology has made an accurate match between the image 
submitted to the technology and the image from its database.46 
However, a recent study has shown that users make the wrong decision 
about a match about half of the time if they have not had specialized 
training in facial identification.47  
D. Private Facial Recognition Companies 
Private companies generally provide law enforcement agencies 
with their facial recognition technology. The only public benchmark to 
assess the accuracy of facial recognition algorithms is a completely 
voluntary competition that the NIST offers every three to four years.48 
Private companies are not required to participate in this competition at 
all, even if they are selling their facial recognition technology to law 
enforcement.49 This evidences a gaping hole in the regulation of private 
facial recognition technologies—there are no current standards that 
ensure their algorithms are accurate. This is especially concerning 
given the bias embedded in facial recognition technology, resulting in 
its increased inaccuracy when identifying minority faces.50  
 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Garvie et al., supra note 22. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See Buolamwini, supra note 12. 
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Further, the government does not directly regulate private facial 
recognition companies’ data collection that is used to create and train 
their algorithms. There are some state laws that indirectly regulate 
facial recognition technology, like the Illinois Biometric Information 
Privacy Act (BIPA). BIPA implicates facial recognition data in its aim 
to protect biometric information in general. However, BIPA does not 
specifically address facial recognition technology. BIPA makes it 
unlawful for any private entity to “collect, capture, purchase, receive 
through trade or otherwise obtain” someone’s biometric identifiers 
unless that person is informed.51 BIPA defines “biometric identifier” as 
an eye scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, hand scan, or face geometry.52  
Clearview AI is a facial recognition company that has contracts 
with more than six hundred law enforcement agencies across the 
country.53 Clearview has collected data from Facebook, Venmo, 
YouTube, and Twitter and amassed three billion images for its facial 
recognition technology.54 The invasive nature of this data scraping is 
alarming and has led to a number of lawsuits claiming that companies 
collecting personal data like this have violated BIPA.55 Specifically, the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a suit against Clearview 
because of the company’s alleged illegal collection and storage of Illinois 
citizens’ faceprints without their knowledge or consent. Further, the 
ACLU alleged that Clearview sold the data to private companies and 
law enforcement, which enables law enforcement to use this data for 
facial recognition purposes.56 Because law enforcement’s use of facial 
recognition technology is vastly unregulated, the access that law 
enforcement has to large amounts of private data is disturbing. 
Other states, such as Texas and Washington, have also enacted 
laws to protect biometric information where the federal government has 
 
 51. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15(b) (West 2020). 
 52. Id. 14/10. 
 53. CEO of AI Startup Dismisses Critics, CBS THIS MORNING (Feb. 5, 2020), 
https://www.cbs.com/shows/cbs_this_morning/video/5EMDCMqNXNddglebBhlvpHYrJUk1lOaw/ 
ceo-of-controversial-ai-startup-dismisses-critics/ [https://perma.cc/KZ5R-353Z].  
 54. Id. 
 55. See Nick Statt, ACLU Sues Facial Recognition Firm Clearview AI, Calling It a  
‘Nightmare Scenario’ for Privacy, VERGE (May 28, 2020, 1:13 PM), https://www.theverge.com/ 
2020/5/28/21273388/aclu-clearview-ai-lawsuit-facial-recognition-database-illinois-biometric-laws 
[https://perma.cc/634X-D9QB]; Taylor Hatmaker, Lawsuits Allege Microsoft, Amazon and Google 
Violated Illinois Facial Recognition Privacy Law, TECHCRUNCH (July 15, 2020, 4:59 PM), 
https://techcrunch.com/2020/07/15/facial-recognition-lawsuit-vance-janecyk-bipa/ 
[https://perma.cc/7H77-UN7C]. 
 56. Complaint at 3–4, Am. C.L. Union v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. 
Ct. May 28, 2020); see Statt, supra note 55. 
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not.57 These state laws do not regulate facial recognition technology and 
its uses, but rather the data itself. Recently, San Francisco became the 
first city to ban facial recognition technology use by its state agencies 
in May 2019.58 In the findings section of the ordinance, the city 
expressed concern that facial recognition technology has the ability to 
endanger civil rights in a way that outweighs the benefits of the 
technology. According to the ordinance, citizens should have the ability 
to live free of continuous government monitoring.59 Further, the 
ordinance points out that this technology exacerbates racial injustice 
because of the disproportionate accuracy rates for different 
demographics.60 
E. Congressional Action 
Local and state governments are beginning to step in to regulate 
where Congress has not. Even though there is a lack of federal 
legislation to regulate facial recognition technology, Congress has held 
hearings and proposed bills on the subject.61 To date, Congress has not 
passed any legislation to regulate facial recognition technology; yet the 
amount of legislation congressional members have proposed over recent 
years signifies an appetite in the legislature to regulate the problematic 
side effects of this technology.  
In 2019, the 116th Congress held two hearings on facial 
recognition technology.62 As a result, two federal bills were  
proposed: the Commercial Facial Recognition Privacy Act of 2019  
and the Facial Recognition Technology Warrant Act.63 The Commercial 
Facial Recognition Privacy Act would require businesses to obtain 
consent from consumers before employing facial recognition 
technology.64 This Act did not specifically address law enforcement. The 
Facial Recognition Technology Warrant Act, on the other hand, would 
have required law enforcement to obtain a warrant based on  
probable cause before using facial recognition technology for ongoing 
 
 57. S. REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMM., 116TH CONG., FACIAL RECOGNITION: POTENTIAL AND 
RISK (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/facial-recognition-potential-and-
risk [https://perma.cc/LGL2-7TR7]. 
 58. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE ch. 19B, § 19B.1, ch. 21, § 21.07 (2020). 
 59. S.F., Cal., Ordinance 107-19 § 1(d) (May 21, 2019). 
 60. Id. § 1(c); see Hill, supra note 1. 
 61. S. REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMM., supra note 57. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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surveillance.65 Moreover, this Act would have limited surveillance to 
thirty days and set additional rules to minimize the data collected on 
people outside a warrant.66 
In particular, a bill introduced in 2019 called the Justice in 
Forensic Algorithms Act targeted issues associated with law 
enforcement using forensic algorithms and introducing these 
algorithms at trial to condemn a defendant. The bill established 
standards and testing requirements for general use of forensic 
algorithms and addressed forensic evidence at trial.67 The bill charged 
the NIST to establish Computation Forensic Algorithms Standards and 
a Computational Forensic Algorithms Testing Program that federal law 
enforcement must comply with when using forensic algorithms.68 The 
bill outlined the NIST standards to include an assessment for potential 
disparate impact on different demographics, requirements for software 
testing, requirements for developers’ public disclosure of documentation 
about the software (including information about the development 
process and its training data), and requirements to provide defendants 
with reports that document the use and results of the forensic software 
program in their trials.69 NIST’s Testing Program required testing in 
accordance with the NIST standards, that testing use realistic data sets 
that represent diverse racial and ethnic groups, and that the test 
results were published online with specifics about the software’s 
performance on diverse populations.70 The bill provided that evidence 
from forensic software would only be admissible in a criminal case if the 
software were to be submitted to the NIST testing program.71 
Further, by proposing that developers cannot assert a trade 
secret privilege to block defendants, this bill protected defendants’ 
access to algorithms’ source codes where the algorithms are used in a 
criminal trial.72 The bill created a blanket rule that trade secret 
protections do not apply in criminal trials “when defendants would 
otherwise be entitled to obtain evidence” by amending the Federal 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Dennis Romboy, Sen. Mike Lee to Police Doing Facial Recognition Surveillance: Get a 
Warrant, DESERET NEWS (Nov. 14, 2019, 7:36 PM), https://www.deseret.com/utah/2019/11/14/ 
20965330/sen-mike-lee-to-police-doing-facial-recognition-surveillance-get-a-warrant 
[https://perma.cc/GQT5-UKUV]. 
 67. See H.R. 4368, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 68. See id. § 2. 
 69. See id. § 2(a). 
 70. See id. § 2(d). 
 71. See id. § 2(g). 
 72. See id. § 2(a). 
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Rules of Evidence.73 Moreover, defendants would receive a report on the 
software used in their cases and would be given access to the software 
so they can test it.74 Because of the extreme nature of this blanket rule 
on trade secret protections, the bill did not gain traction to pass.75 
A final piece of federal legislation—the George Floyd Justice in 
Policing Act—was proposed on the House Floor in June 2020 to regulate 
police departments.76 The bill passed in the House, but did not pass in 
the Senate.77 A notable part of this legislation that specifically applied 
to facial recognition technology—the Federal Police Camera and 
Accountability Act—required police officers to wear body cameras to 
conduct their searches and make their arrests but prohibited officers 
from equipping or employing facial recognition technology on their body 
cameras.78 Further, any footage from their body cameras was not to be 
subject to facial recognition technology.79 The proposed bill imposed 
broad regulations on police departments to increase transparency and 
accountability, with the goal of reducing discriminatory practices.80 The 
bill, however, did not pass through the Senate because of partisan 
disagreements.81  
F. Facial Recognition Evidence at Trial 
Facial recognition evidence has not yet been introduced at 
trial.82 However, with increasing use of the technology, it is likely that 
prosecutors will begin to introduce this technology as evidence to 
establish probable cause or as evidence of an individual’s 
identification.83 In this context, evidentiary questions will likely emerge 
about the scientific reliability of facial recognition technology, which 
 
 73. Id. § 2(b). 
 74. Press Release, Mark Takano, House of Representatives, Rep. Takano Introduces the 
Justice in Forensic Algorithms Act to Protect Defendants’ Due Process Rights in the Criminal 
Justice System (Sept. 17, 2019), https://takano.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/rep-takano-in-
troduces-the-justice-in-forensic-algorithms-act-to-protect-defendants-due-process-rights-in-the-
criminal-justice-system [https://perma.cc/7QY7-M7AH]. 
 75. See H.R. 4368, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 76. See George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020, H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. (2020). 
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. §§ 372, 374. 
 79. Id. § 374. 
 80. See H.R. REP. NO. 116-434, at 37–38 (2020). 
 81. See Li Zhou & Ella Nilsen, The House Just Passed a Sweeping Police Reform Bill, VOX 
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must be established under the Frye or Daubert standard before the 
evidence is admitted.84  
There is an array of issues that arises regarding the reliability 
of facial recognition technology evidence. For instance, the technology 
has limitations on its accuracy given the conditions of the photos being 
analyzed.85 The technology works best when photos are taken head-on 
with good lighting and no movement.86 Consequently, the accuracy of 
the technology decreases when there is no standardized photo for 
comparison or when a photo was taken in an uncontrolled environment, 
perhaps from a different angle with low-quality lighting.87 Further, the 
evolving nature of faces and appearances affects the accuracy of the 
technology because of changes like a new hairstyle, facial hair growth, 
weight gain or loss, and aging.88 Many facial recognition systems are 
also less accurate when reading faces of certain demographics, 
specifically Black people.89  
Moreover, the proprietary nature of this technology is 
problematic when analyzing whether a facial recognition technology 
has been reviewed by other experts in the field.90 Many police 
departments contract with private companies that are not willing to 
disclose their trade secrets.91 To address these concerns, this Note 
conducts an analysis of the reliability of evidence from facial recognition 
technology under the Daubert factors.92 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Facial Recognition Technology Admissibility as Evidence 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs whether an expert 
witness’s testimony is admitted into evidence, and was effectively 
created, in part, by the Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. See id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.; Buolamwini, supra note 12; NIST Study, supra note 10. 
 90. See John Nawara, Machine Learning: Face Recognition Technology Evidence in  
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Pharmaceutical, Inc.93 Because federal courts adhere to Daubert to 
assess the reliability of expert evidence, this Note uses the Daubert 
factors to analyze the admissibility of results from facial recognition 
technology. In Daubert, the Supreme Court established a set of factors 
to assess the reliability of scientific expert testimony.94 This new test 
was meant to establish a “gatekeeping” role for federal courts in 
determining what evidence should be admitted.95 The non-exhaustive 
list of factors that the Daubert Court provided are (1) whether the 
technique can be or has been tested; (2) whether the technique has been 
subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the technique’s known or 
ascertainable rate of error; (4) whether there are recognized standards 
for using the technique; and (5) whether the technique has been 
generally accepted in the relevant specialty scientific fields.96 
In subsequent decisions, the Court has clarified that the inquiry 
is not about the general validity of the expert’s discipline.97 Rather, the 
inquiry is specifically about the reliability of the particular technique 
that the expert relies on in his testimony.98 This Note applies this list 
of Daubert factors to facial recognition technology to consider whether 
this type of evidence should be admitted in trial. Ultimately, this Note 
concludes that it should not be admitted into trial as evidence based on 
the current state of the technology and the lack of regulation. 
1. Factor One: Testability 
Facial recognition technology is easily testable.99 In general, it is 
much easier to test a mathematical system that takes measurements 
and produces results rather than, for example, a sociological theory.100 
Facial recognition technology produces results that can easily be shown 
to be false. It is possible to create experiments that estimate how likely 
a system is to result in false positive or false negative results.101 One 
disturbing example of the testability of facial recognition technology  
is Google’s recognition system that falsely identified two Black 
 
 93. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment; Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 94. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–94. 
 95. Mohammed Osman & Edward Imwinkelried, Facial Recognition Systems, 50 CRIM. L. 
BULL., no. 3, 2014, at 695. 
 96. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94. 
 97. Osman & Imwinkelried, supra note 95; see Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 
(1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 98. Osman & Imwinkelried, supra note 95. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Nawara, supra note 90, at 612. 
 101. Osman & Imwinkelried, supra note 95. 
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individuals as gorillas in 2015, resulting in public criticism and outcry 
to improve the system.102  
Even though facial recognition technology can be easily tested, 
there is another aspect of this factor: whether the technology actually 
has been tested and what the results were.103 As explored above, there 
is no mandatory testing of facial recognition technology.104 The NIST 
offers a voluntary facial recognition technology competition, but facial 
recognition technology companies are not required by any governing 
body to test their technology.105 It is reasonable to think that companies 
will proactively test their technology to refine their products, but these 
internal test results are not publicly available. It is evident that facial 
recognition technology has been tested because of the variety of studies 
that have evaluated its accuracy, but this sporadic testing is not 
adequate.106  
The NIST has published the most comprehensive reports on 
tests and evaluations of facial recognition technology. NIST’s Face 
Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT) Program produces studies and reports 
on different aspects of the technology.107 Importantly, NIST’s FRVT 
program evaluates algorithms that are submitted by research and 
development laboratories.108 These algorithms are not necessarily 
available as products, but rather are prototypes.109 Therefore, this 
testing can only speak to the reliability of facial recognition prototypes, 
not the actual technology that is used and implemented.110 This 
weakens the claim that facial recognition technology should be 
admitted into trial as evidence because the most comprehensive reports 
on facial recognition technology and its accuracy test prototypes, not 
final products. 
Facial recognition technology’s embedded bias is one particular 
concern that has arisen as a result of testing the technology.111 Part 3 
of the NIST FRVT program evaluated the accuracy of facial recognition 
 
 102. Nutter, supra note 28, at 933. 
 103. Osman & Imwinkelried, supra note 95. 
 104. See discussion supra Section I.D. 
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https://www.nist.gov/programs-projects/face-recognition-vendor-test-frvt [https://perma.cc/8U8V-
EXE2] (last visited Feb. 23, 2021). 
 108. PATRICK GROTHER, MEI NGAN & KAYEE HANAOKA, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & 
TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., FACE RECOGNITION VENDOR TEST (FRVT) PART 3: DEMOGRAPHIC 
EFFECTS 1 (2019), https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8280 [https://perma.cc/8VSA-4WRW]. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. 
 111. See id. at 4, 14–15; Buolamwini, supra note 12.  
906 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.  [Vol. 23:4:891 
algorithms with different demographic groups.112 The study tested 
algorithms from the majority of the industry and found that algorithms 
generated higher rates of false positives for Black faces—sometimes up 
to one hundred times more false identifications—than white faces.113 
Even though the accuracy of facial recognition technology will improve 
over time, the current bias in these systems is concerning and weakens 
the claim that it should be allowed into trial as evidence. 
2. Factor Two: Peer Review and Publication 
There is no question that there is an abundance of literature on 
facial recognition technology. The scientific community has written 
about this technology and explored its uses and applications. However, 
the proprietary nature of facial recognition technology raises questions 
about the level of scrutiny applied to it.114 Because police departments 
contract with private companies for facial recognition technology, there 
are concerns about how meaningfully the academic community can 
feasibly analyze these companies’ technologies without access to the 
inner workings of the software.115 This concern cuts against admitting 
facial recognition technology as evidence because disclosure of the 
technology’s source code is necessary to evaluate the reliability of the 
technology.116 
3. Factor Three: Rate of Error 
There are two different error rates to consider with facial 
recognition technology.117 The first error rate is described with the 
embedded bias of the technology: the error rate with respect to training 
data.118 This error rate leads to increased performance over time by 
using machine learning and better data to train the algorithm.119 The 
second error rate is the inaccuracy that ensues when an algorithm is 
unleashed in the real world with unknown conditions where photos may 
not be taken in the standard way that the algorithm has been trained.120 
There may be poor lighting, or the photo may be taken from an angle 
 
 112. GROTHER ET AL., supra note 108, at 30–33. 
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 114. See Nawara, supra note 90. 
 115. Id. 
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without a full view of the subject’s face.121 Further, a particular error 
rate may not speak to the technology’s accuracy when it is applied to a 
person who does not share characteristics with the initial training 
data.122 As mentioned above, facial recognition technology is frequently 
trained on data sets that are not diverse.123 Therefore, the technology’s 
error rate may be much higher when applied to an individual of color.124  
It is difficult to judge the most accurate error rate because of the 
different possible error rates that may be reported and the variability 
of error rates when applied to subjects with different appearances.125 A 
technology with a nondiverse data set may be fairly accurate when 
applied to a white individual. However, when it is applied to a Black 
individual, it is doubtful that the expert has complied with FRE 702(d) 
and “reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the 
case.”126 
4. Factor Four: Standards 
There are no standards set out to control the development and 
operation of facial recognition technology.127 Companies develop their 
own facial recognition technology and keep their information to 
themselves.128 Therefore, standards have not developed in this industry 
and this is problematic for facial recognition systems.129 This factor is 
straightforward because there are no published standards for facial 
recognition technology, and this factor weakens the argument that 
facial recognition technology evidence should be admitted into trial as 
evidence.130  
5. Factor Five: General Acceptance 
Machine learning is generally accepted,131 and there is an array 
of facial recognition protocols and tests that has also been generally 
accepted in the scientific community.132 However, the proprietary 
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nature of this technology is, again, concerning; the particular methods 
for the evidence introduced are not disclosed by the private companies 
who own this technology.133 
Under the five Daubert factors alone, it is unlikely that results 
from facial recognition technology will be allowed into evidence at 
trial.134 These five factors, however, do not constitute an exhaustive  
list; courts may consider other factors when evaluating the 
admissibility of expert witness testimony. Therefore, even if the results 
from facial recognition technology would not be admissible under the 
five factors listed in Daubert, courts may nonetheless admit these 
results into evidence.135 If results from facial recognition technology are 
admitted into evidence, the defendant has the right to challenge and  
cross-examine.136 
B. Contestability of Facial Recognition Technology Evidence 
Just because evidence has been deemed “reliable” under the 
Daubert inquiry does not mean that the evidence is correct.137 The 
Daubert factors ask about the reliability of the scientific expert’s 
methodology in reaching a conclusion, but the correctness of the 
conclusion itself must be evaluated in the adversarial process.138 Legal 
scholars refer to cross-examination as the “greatest legal engine ever 
invented for the discovery of truth.”139 Thus, defendants have a 
significant interest in contesting evidence from a facial recognition 
technology system that could be inaccurate.140 
 
 133. Id. at 614. 
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The Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause states that “[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him.”141 In practice, this clause 
requires witnesses to be present at trial to be cross-examined so that 
the defendant may confront his accuser.142 Given a defendant’s right to 
confront his accuser, this policy favors giving defendants the right to 
challenge the source code of the facial recognition technology because it 
is the processes of the technology that generate the condemning result. 
1. Defendant’s Right to Cross-Examine Facial Recognition Source 
Code 
The foundation of our adversarial system relies on  
cross-examining human witnesses; this traditional system of 
confrontation has not, to date, caught up with the standardization of 
technology in our society.143 New technologies present “process-based” 
evidence which is dependent on a machine using its standardized 
processes.144 Rather than confronting lay and expert witnesses, 
defendants are often challenged with confronting machine witnesses. 
This is starkly different from the typical eyewitness testimony for which 
the confrontation clause was designed. Therefore, the reliability of 
machine witnesses demands a different type of analysis.145  
The Supreme Court held in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts  
that certified forensic lab reports are testimonial evidence and are 
inadmissible unless accompanied by a lab technician who can certify 
and attest to the validity of the report.146 As a result of this holding,  
a forensic technician must testify in court and be subject to  
cross-examination.147 However, the confrontation clause may not be 
satisfied by a lab technician testifying on behalf of a process-based 
technology.148 The appropriate target of cross-examination is the 
standardized process, not the lab technician.149 The process itself, not 
the technician’s observations or negligible involvement, accuses the 
defendant.150  
 
 141. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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Defendants have a right to challenge the evidence presented 
against them in a meaningful way. Thus, it is important to think about 
the specifics of challenging facial recognition technology evidence. 
Source code is the “heart” of a computer program.151 This code contains 
all the instructions for the technology to operate, dictates which tasks 
it will perform, and determines how it will perform them.152 Gaining 
access to the technology’s source code would be the most meaningful 
way for the defendant to challenge facial recognition technology because 
it would reveal information about the algorithm’s inner workings that 
private companies keep to themselves.153  
Having access to the source code of a program is comparable to 
“looking under the hood” of a car, which is distinct from watching a car 
drive.154 While someone can learn limited details from observing a 
moving vehicle, the observer cannot understand the true inner 
workings of a car without looking under the hood.155 The Volkswagen 
cheating scandal is particularly illustrative. In 2015, Volkswagen 
admitted that it had rigged its software—its secret code—so that its 
diesel cars would pass emissions tests when they actually did not meet 
the EPA’s requirements.156 The people who inspected Volkswagen’s cars 
had no idea that the software’s pollution-control equipment kicked in 
only during inspections.157 The software took cues from the position of 
the steering wheel, the speed of the vehicle, and how long the engine 
was running to detect an ongoing inspection and then turned on the 
pollution-control mechanism.158 The inspectors were able to watch the 
car drive, but they were oblivious to the deceitful inner workings of the 
proprietary software.159 It is the same for computer programs and 
technologies; an observer learns limited information from watching the 
program in action.160 The source code is necessary to know about the 
technology’s processes.161 
A secret algorithm that offers a condemning result is like 
evidence offered by an anonymous expert, whom a defendant cannot 
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cross-examine.162 The confrontation clause clearly provides defendants 
the right to cross-examine their accusers; accordingly, defendants 
should have access to the source code of the technologies that accuse 
them.163 
However, facial recognition technology and its processes are 
proprietary in nature. Private companies do not disclose the processes 
and intricacies of their technology because they are competing in a 
marketplace with other companies. Therefore, a facial recognition 
company claiming its source code to be a trade secret to avoid disclosing 
it to the court is a foreseeable obstacle for defendants who may want to 
challenge results from facial recognition technology. 
2. Developers’ Trade Secret Privilege 
The rationale behind allowing companies to invoke a trade 
secret privilege is to encourage innovation and to discourage unfair 
business practices.164 For a company, the first step in successfully 
invoking the trade secret privilege is to show that one has a valid trade 
secret under the jurisdictional requirements.165 In the context of 
criminal cases, there is a lower likelihood that criminal defendants will 
have the resources to challenge a claimant’s asserted privilege.166 
Therefore, it is safer for companies to assert the privilege in the 
criminal context, and companies are more likely to overclaim the 
privilege where there is no true trade secret.167 Overclaiming becomes 
problematic and harmful to the administration of criminal justice 
because courts frequently deny defendants’ discovery of a company’s 
claimed trade secret.168 This prevents defendants from gaining access 
to the inner workings of a company’s technology—specifically the source 
code—which is needed for a defendant to meaningfully confront the 
witnesses that testify against him.169 
Developers have already used the trade secret privilege to  
block defendants from gaining access to the source code of their 
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technologies.170 For example, a California defendant was denied access 
to a forensic software’s source code used to convict him of murder 
because the software developer claimed trade secret privilege.171 The 
technology was a statistical tool that was used to calculate the 
likelihood that the defendant’s DNA was in a sample from the crime 
scene.172 A California trial court had ordered the developer to disclose 
the source code because the defendant’s right to confront and  
cross-examine a witness would be denied without it.173 However, the 
California Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit held for the developer 
concluding that the trade secret privilege applied in this criminal 
trial.174  
Granting trade secret privilege in the criminal context can be 
problematic and raises concerns about the administration of justice. 
When evaluating whether to grant trade secret privilege to a company, 
a court’s first consideration is whether the alleged trade secret is valid 
and whether ordering its disclosure would cause harm.175  
Moreover, courts generally also weigh the risk of harm resulting 
from the disclosure against the need for the protected information.176 
Using this balancing test is problematic because it places a company’s 
financial interests on the same level as a criminal defendant’s life and 
liberty, which should be valued more heavily.177 Further, the way that 
courts have generally applied this test in the criminal context suggests 
that intellectual property owners are prioritized over defendants in the 
criminal justice system.178 Ultimately, defendants have a right to 
confront their accuser under the confrontation clause; using the trade 
secret privilege to prevent defendants from gaining access to the source 
code and inner workings of the technology that condemns them impedes 
the administration of justice.  
Additionally, it is unnecessary for developers to invoke the trade 
secret privilege because there are already procedural safeguards in 
place to limit the defendant’s access to protected information through 
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criminal discovery and subpoena procedures.179 Courts can deny 
frivolous or abusive motions for discovery, and they can also grant 
protective orders to guard the trade secrets at issue.180 
Ultimately, the rationale for the trade secret privilege—to 
encourage innovation and prevent unfair business practices—cannot 
justify a blanket trade secret privilege in the criminal justice system.181 
Criminal defendants are unlikely to be competitors of the private 
companies creating facial recognition technology; and therefore, the 
trade secret privilege should not be available to completely block 
defendants from access to the inner workings of the software.182 
However, it is worth noting that companies have an interest in 
protecting their information because defendants could be careless with 
it. It is foreseeable that a company’s competitor in the marketplace 
could bribe a criminal defendant to disclose protected information that 
the defendant accesses during trial. Yet, given the seriousness of a 
criminal charge, on balance, criminal defendants who have been 
incriminated by evidence from facial recognition technology should 
have the right to challenge this evidence by accessing the source code 
and “looking under the hood” of these technologies, with possible 
protections for developers and their technology. 
3. Challenging Facial Recognition Technology Evidence 
If evidence from facial recognition technology is admitted into 
court, there are a variety of defenses that a defendant can invoke to bar 
the admission of the evidence. If granted access to the source code that 
provides insight into the inner workings of the technology, defendants 
can present arguments about the accuracy of the technology, the 
accuracy of the specific test that was run, and whether the test should 
have been run at all. 
First, defendants can assert that the technology itself may be 
embedded with bias. On cross, a criminal defendant can expose issues 
in the way the algorithm was trained. These issues indicate the 
algorithm’s poor performance with particular demographics and 
potentially an incorrect identification in the defendant’s case.183 As 
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mentioned above, studies have shown that facial recognition technology 
performs worse on Black subjects.184 
Further, the photo that was used to run a facial recognition test 
may be challenged. As mentioned above,185 facial recognition technology 
works best when a photo is taken head-on with good lighting and  
no movement.186 However, when the technology is unleashed in 
uncontrolled circumstances, photos are taken from different angles 
with different lighting that could lead to less accurate results.187 
Moreover, a person’s evolving appearance can lead to less accurate 
results due to newly grown facial hair, weight gain or loss, or aging.188 
The use of facial recognition technology can also be challenged 
as an “unreasonable search” under the Fourth Amendment.189 While 
protections against facial recognition searches have not yet been 
established in this context, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence 
suggests that certain protections exist against unfettered monitoring of 
citizens’ whereabouts.190 Facial recognition technology can be used to 
monitor the location of a person. Because this government action is 
particularly intrusive, the use of this technology could be challenged on 
Fourth Amendment grounds. In the 2012 United States v. Jones 
decision, the Court held that installing a GPS tracking device on an 
automobile and using it to track the vehicle’s movements for an 
extended amount of time was a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment.191 Justice Alito wrote in his concurring opinion that 
“society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others 
would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor 
and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very 
long period.”192 Further, in 2018, the Supreme Court held in Carpenter 
v. United States that accessing cell phone records for the purpose of 
obtaining the location of the device constituted a Fourth Amendment 
search and a probable-cause search warrant was needed to gain access 
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to such records.193 Therefore, defendants can use existing case law to 
challenge law enforcement’s use of facial recognition technology to 
monitor their location as a Fourth Amendment search requiring a 
probable-cause search warrant.194 
III. SOLUTION 
Based on the Daubert analysis in Part II,195 this Note 
recommends that results from facial recognition technology should not 
be admitted into evidence based on the current state of the technology. 
Moreover, this Note recommends that Congress pass a law to grant 
defendants access to the software’s source code if the software’s results 
are admitted in their trials, with possible protections for the software 
developer’s information.  
A. Admissibility 
 The Daubert factors will guide federal judges’ analysis when 
results from facial recognition technology are introduced in court. 
Results from facial recognition technology should not be admitted into 
evidence at trial because of the current lack of testing of facial 
recognition technology, the absence of meaningful peer review due to 
the proprietary nature of the technology, the difficulty in calculating an 
error rate, the shortage of industry standards, and the lack of 
meaningful general acceptance in the scientific community.196 However, 
if standards or a testing protocol were established in this industry—as 
proposed in the Justice in Forensic Algorithms Act of 2019—then the 
Daubert analysis would evolve, and the evidence may be perceived as 
more reliable.197 This would likely lead to admissions of evidence from 
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facial recognition technology. However, the current state of the industry 
suggests that results from facial recognition technology should not be 
admitted in federal court. 
B. Contestability 
Congress should adopt a law where criminal defendants are 
granted access to the results from forensic software used in their cases, 
access to the software itself, and access to the software’s source code to 
challenge the evidence presented against them.198 Further, Congress 
should allow developers to continue to claim trade secret privilege, but 
it should not block defendants from accessing the software. Instead, 
judges should make a case-by-case determination on how to best protect 
a developer’s trade secret while also granting criminal defendants the 
right to access this critical source code. 
For example, the proposed Justice in Forensic Algorithms Act of 
2019 would protect defendants’ access to the algorithms’ source code by 
ensuring developers cannot assert a trade secret privilege to block 
defendants’ access.199 The bill creates a blanket rule that trade secret 
protections do not apply in criminal trials “when defendants would 
otherwise be entitled to obtain evidence” by amending the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.200 Further, the proposed bill provides that 
defendants would receive a report on the software used in their cases 
and would be given access to the software so they can test it.201 The 
extreme nature of this blanket ban on trade secret protections made the 
bill unlikely to pass.202 
This Note supports the general spirit of this bill—ensuring that 
defendants obtain access to the software and its source code to challenge 
the evidence used against them. This proposed bill is problematic, 
however, because it disincentivizes innovation. If developers know that 
their trade secrets could be available to opposing parties in litigation at 
any time, the incentive to innovate and improve their products will be 
diminished. Their competitive advantage is eliminated if opposing 
parties gain full access to the developer’s trade secrets and then disclose 
that information to competitors or to the public. Further, the proposal 
does not adequately weigh the intellectual property interests of the 
 
evidence from forensic software would only be admissible in a criminal case if the software was 
submitted to the NIST testing program. Id. § 2(g)(1). 
 198. Cf. Chessman, supra note 116, at 183; Imwinkelried, supra note 138, at 126–27. 
 199. See H.R. 4368, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 200. Id. § 2(b). 
 201. Takano, supra note 74. 
 202. See generally H.R. 4368, 116th Cong. (2019). 
2021] DANGERS OF FACIAL RECOGNITION EVIDENCE 917 
companies. Instead of a blanket rule against a trade secret privilege, a 
more nuanced solution would better balance the competing interests at 
issue. This Note proposes a middle-ground approach: developers may 
invoke the trade secret privilege in criminal cases, but they cannot 
categorically block the defendant’s access to the software.  
In practice, a court would first issue an order specifying the 
conditions under which the defendant can have access to the company’s 
software and documentation. The company would be responsible for 
enforcing the court-ordered protections for its software. After giving the 
defendant access to this information, it would be up to defendant’s 
counsel to closely scrutinize the software and its inner workings. 
Defendant’s counsel may consider hiring an expert to assist in 
understanding the technology’s source code. While this may be costly 
for the defendant, this solution provides criminal defendants with an 
opportunity to meaningfully confront their accusers. 
This approach would leave the door open for judges to provide 
protection for the developer. For instance, after giving defendants 
access to the software’s source code, the judge could decide that its 
disclosure is subject to a protective order.203 For example, courts  
have required disclosure subject to protective orders with varying 
constraints: the experts granted access are subject to vetting; the 
experts sign a declaration to acknowledge their obligation not to 
circulate the protected information; the experts are allowed to study the 
information exclusively in secure areas; and the experts have to conduct 
their analysis on protected computers.204 These types of provisions 
ensure protection for the developer and also give the defendant access 
to the software so the defendant can meaningfully challenge the 
evidence presented against him. This solution does not always require 
protective orders because it is possible that, in some cases, the threat of 
private information disclosure is so low that it does not outweigh the 
costs associated with enforcing a protective order. As demonstrated, a 
case-by-case approach is the best solution for deciding what protections 
are granted to developers that avoid treading on a defendant’s right to 
confrontation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Note cautions against admitting results from facial 
recognition technology into evidence at trial based on the current 
infancy and bias of the technology. Further, if the evidence is admitted, 
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defendants should have access to the software’s source code to 
meaningfully challenge the evidence presented against them under  
the confrontation clause. This Note recognizes the developers’ interest 
in protecting trade secrets and argues that judges should make  
case-by-case determinations about how to protect developers’ 
information without blocking defendants’ access to the software. 
Because of the current bias of facial recognition software and its 
disparate accuracy in identifying different demographics, it is 
important to critically analyze the state of the technology and the 
industry before allowing it to be admitted into evidence at trial. This 
Note presents a call to action to examine law enforcement’s use of  
facial recognition technology and to prevent unreliable uses from 
incriminating defendants without an opportunity for these defendants 
to exercise their constitutional right to confront the algorithm that 
accuses them.  
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